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Abstract 
Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to 
assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other 
cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on developmen-
tal processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this project. In this 
discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of causal specificity is of considerable interest to the philosophy of biology be-
cause it promises to provide a rationale for the appeal of a certain kind of explanatory strategy 
that has been very prominent in 20th and 21st Century biology. This strategy consists in focus-
ing explanations on biological entities that are often described as information-bearing, a kind 
of description that many take to be metaphorical (e.g., Sarkar 1996; Griffiths 2001).1 The usu-
al suspects for such biological entities include genomic DNA as well as messenger-RNA 
(mRNA), which feature prominently in countless biological explanations and are often de-
scribed as “determining” the sequences within proteins or RNAs. However, as proponents of 
Developmental Systems Theory have pointed out, we should respect a principle of “causal 
parity” or “parity of reasoning” and not take it for granted that such entities actually do play 
such a special causal role (e.g., Oyama 2000; Griffiths and Gray 2005). The attribution of any 
such role requires some positive account of what exactly that special role consists in, which 
has proven to be more difficult than one might have thought. 
 A promising attempt to provide such an account has used the idea that what distin-
guishes genetic material from other biological causes is their causal specificity (Waters 2007; 
Woodward 2010; for a critique see Griffiths and Stotz 2013, Ch. 4).2 According to this idea, 
some causes allow a much more fine-grained control over their effect variable than others. For 
example, a light dimmer allows a more fine-grained control of light intensity than a simple 
toggle switch. Similarly, so it is argued, DNA and RNA sequence variation is a causal differ-
ence-maker that has a more fine-grained control over their effects than other parts of a living 
cell, e.g., the enzymes that are necessary for protein synthesis. Is it this fine-grain or specifici-
ty that justifies the biologists’ highlighting of certain biomolecules as information-bearers, 
even if the latter description should still be metaphorical?  
 Existing attempts to answer this question in the affirmative are largely qualitative. Wa-
ters (2007) as well as Woodward (2010) treated causal specificity as a property of causal rela-
tions that is either present or absent, even though they both hinted that it admits of degrees. In 
my (2006, 2013) I considered causal specificity to be a matter of degrees and argued that some 
genetic causes, namely DNA and mRNA, manifest a greater degree of specificity with respect 
to RNA or protein sequence than other causal factors involved in gene expression (Waters 
2007 tentatively accepts this claim in a footnote).  However, no quantitative measure of the 
degree of causal specificity was available then. Thus, Griffiths et al. have done us a great ser-
vice in developing a way of measuring it. In fact, they provide the first precise definition of 
this notion. Basically, they identify causal specificity with the mutual information that inter-
																																																								
1 Griffiths and Stotz (2013, Ch. 6) argue that the notion of genetic information is metaphorical 
but that such metaphors play a constructive role in science.  
2 There are other attempts that all have their merits in my view, e.g., Stegmann’s (2014) idea 
of external ordering or Shea’s (2007) infotel theory, but they shall not be considered here. 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
	
ventions on a cause variable and the value of an effect variable bear on each other. Thus, basic 
concepts of information theory turn out to be helpful.  
 Using this information-theoretic specificity measure, Griffiths et al. venture to compare 
different causes of organismic development with respect to their causal specificity. They con-
sider three kinds of causal specificity, namely the specificity of the total potential variation of 
the cause variable with respect to its effect (labeled “INF”, after Woodward 2010) as well as 
the specificity of the actual variation in select populations or “SAD” (inspired by Waters 
2007). In addition, they examine my idea of considering only the relevant potential variation 
(REL) where relevance is defined in terms of biological normality (Weber 2013). I take the 
upshot of their analysis to be the following. First, the specificity of causes depends strongly on 
what probability distribution over the states of a causal variable is assumed. Second, in the 
context of developmental biology, SAD returns no significantly greater specificity for DNA 
than for alternative splicing. Third, in spite of being targeted at relevant variation, REL alone 
fails to provide a sufficient criterion for relevant causal specificity; a sufficient criterion would 
have to take into account additional parameters such as timescales.  
 I applaud the introduction of a precise, quantitative definition of causal specificity to 
this debate and agree with Griffiths et al. that our causal specificity comparisons had better be 
biologically meaningful. What I want to show here is that the quantitative version of causal 
specificity as defined by Griffiths et al. can actually do the job for which its qualitative ances-
tor was introduced into the philosophy of biology by Woodward and Waters: to provide a ra-
tionale for the biologists’ highlighting of DNA and related biomolecules in some of their ex-
planations.  
 I will proceed as follows. First, I briefly present the specificity measure proposed by 
Griffiths et al. (Section 2). In Section 3, I examine which kind of causal specificity is mean-
ingfully compared between different biological causes. I conclude that it is relevant potential 
variation (REL). Section 4 then applies this measure to alternative splicing and Section 5 to 
DNA sequence variation. Section 6 draws together my main points.  
 
2. What Is Causal Specificity and How Can We Measure It? 
Both Waters (2007) and Woodward (2010) introduce causal specificity by using David Lew-
is’s (2000) concept of influence (which the latter introduced for a different purpose, namely to 
define the causal relation itself). On the basis of this, Woodward defines what it means for a 
causal relation to be specific: 
 
(INF) There are a number of different possible states of C (C1… Cn), a number of dif-
ferent possible states of E (E1… Em) and a mapping F from C to E such that for many 
states of C each such state has a unique image under F in E (that is, F is a function or 
close to it, so that the same state of C is not associated with different states of E, either 
on the same or different occasions), not too many different states of C are mapped onto 
the same state of E and most states of E are the image under F of some state of C. This 
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mapping F should describe patterns of counterfactual dependency between states of C 
and states of E that support interventionist counterfactuals. Variations in the time and 
place of occurrence of the various states of E should similarly depend on variations in 
the time and place of occurrence of states of C (Woodward 2010, p. 305). 
 
For Woodward, the relation INF (after Lewis’s term “influence”) does not define causal de-
pendence; it is rather a relation that causal links may or may not manifest. However, given this 
definition it could be argued that INF is a matter of degree where the degree depends on the 
number of states that are correlated by the mapping as well as the closeness of the mapping to 
a bijection. Griffiths et al. argue that both of these two factors affect the amount of information 
that is gained about the effect by intervening on a cause variable. To take this into account, 
they define causal specificity or SPEC as the information gained about the state of the effect 
variable by setting the cause variable to an exogenously determined value. Using information 
theory, Griffiths et al. identify SPEC with the difference between the entropy of the effect var-
iable's value set H(E) and its entropy conditional on setting the cause variable to some specific 
value. Formally, this can be represented by using Pearl's 'do ( )' operator which is symbolized 
by a hat: 
 𝐼 𝐸; 𝐶 = 𝐻 𝐸 − 𝐻 𝐸 𝐶  
 
The causal specificity of C relative to E, thus, is the mutual information 𝐼 𝐸; 𝐶 , which corre-
sponds to the difference in entropy before and after an intervention.  
 Having briefly outlined the basic idea of the specificity measure proposed by Griffiths 
et al., I will now turn to the different kinds of variation for which causal specificity may be 
compared. 
 	
3. Which Kind of Causal Specificity Should We Compare? 
As was already indicated, causal specificity can be measured over the range of all possible 
values that a causal variable can take (INF), some range of values that are taken to be relevant 
(REL) or the actual values that the variable takes in a real population (SAD). When comparing 
biological causes, which kind of causal specificity matters for highlighting some causes for 
their explanatory salience? I will briefly argue here that the most informative feature is the 
relevant potential variation or REL.  
Let us first consider SAD, the actual variation. In their comparisons involving alterna-
tive splicing, Griffiths et al. want to take into consideration the causal specificity that inheres 
in “the variation between cells in an organism, both spatial and temporal” (545).  However, in 
their actual calculations they assume that the splice variants are equally probable. This seems 
to be at odds with their intention to use “the actual probability distribution over the values of a 
causal variable in some population” (541-542), for this would require that the actual frequen-
cies of the different splice variants be taken into account. If some splice variants were over-
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whelmingly more abundant than others, this could significantly reduce the entropy of the 
probability distribution and therefore the causal specificity. It is of course unlikely that all 
splice variants occur with the same frequency in any actual population, thus it is not clear what 
the entropy figures calculated actually mean with respect to actual populations. Griffiths et al. 
cite as the main reason for this the lack of data on the real probabilities.  
It seems to me that the difficulties with SAD run deeper than a lack of data. The main 
problem is that SAD is very sensitive to the relative abundance of a causal factor in some de-
fined population. Thus, SAD-values will be highly context-dependent, to such an extent as to 
make any kind of systematic comparison across contexts difficult.  
 INF is the causal specificity of the possible range of values for a variable, which may 
be assumed to be equiprobable. Mad or gerrymandered possibilities show that there is a prob-
lem with this measure, which is due to a lack of constraints on the space of possibilities. For 
example, in my (2013) I discuss a scenario for protein synthesis where the codon-amino acid 
assignments jointly mediated by tRNA and aminoacyl-tRNA synthase enzymes are altered 
after each round of the ribosome cycle by a hypothetical intervention. A similarly mad scenar-
io exists for alternative splicing (see the next section). I see no reason why such mad scenari-
os, even though they are physically possible, should be considered as biologically meaningful 
because these possibilities are inaccessible. For this reason, I think the most meaningful com-
parisons to make are between some relevant sets of possibilities. Of course, different rele-
vance criteria are imaginable, but my suggestion to include those possible values of the varia-
bles that could be produced by biologically normal interventions seems appropriate in at least 
some biological contexts (Weber 2013). Biologically normal interventions as I introduced 
them in my (2013) are such that they (1) could also be a result of natural processes at some 
non-negligible probability and (2) are compatible with the normal biological functioning of 
the rest of the organism.3 A point mutation would be an example of a biologically normal in-
tervention in this sense, while a complete change of the codon specificities of tRNA after each 
round of the ribosome cycle wouldn’t be. This is why biologists consider DNA and mRNA to 
be information-bearing molecules while tRNAs and aminoacyl-tRNA synthase molecules are 
viewed as being part of the machinery that merely “reads” or “expresses” the genetic infor-
mation, even though there is no difference in causal specificity of the potential variation of 
these biomolecules. And this is also why they consider the causal specificity of the potential 
DNA as well as mRNA variation to be biologically relevant, while a large range of possible 
splice variants, namely those that are not producible by biologically normal interventions, are 
of no interest to them. 
 The most important alternative to this approach is Waters (2007), who has persuasively 
argued that biologists are often interested in actual-difference making causes. It should be not-																																																								
3 As Ken Waters pointed out to me, there are interesting similarities between my notion of 
biological normality and Wimsatt's (2001) concept of generative entrenchment, to be explored 
elsewhere. 
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ed that to agree to focus on actual-difference making causes does not commit us to determin-
ing SAD in the way in which Griffiths et al. do, who measure causal specificity only over the 
realized states of a variable. By contrast, Waters (2007, 574) only requires that many of the 
different states of a variable be realized in a population, not all of them. Thus, his conception 
of a specific actual-difference making cause is one where a causal variable for which there is 
actual variation in a population and where this variation explains the actual variation in an 
effect variable may also have unrealized possible values that contribute to its specificity. This 
is different from Griffiths et al.’s SAD, and it is fully compatible with my approach taken 
here, so long as it is made clear that the unrealized possible values of the variable in question 
are in the set of relevant possibilities.  
 Waters’s account thus construed may also be able to deal with the gerrymandered cases 
discussed above. For those cases require variation in causal variables that are usually not actu-
al difference-makers, e.g., codon-amino acid assignments or the recognition sequences for 
splicing. However, Waters’s account will also exclude cases such as the DSCAM gene exam-
ined by Griffiths et al. where DNA is not an actual-difference maker in the populations of in-
terest. For this reason, I think that relevant potential variation is the best choice. 
 A final but important desideratum, as Griffiths et al. (2015, 545) remind us, is that the 
relevance criteria be “rigorously enforced” for both genetic and non-genetic causes when 
comparing their causal specificity, on pains of violating parity of reasoning. This is what I aim 
for in the following two sections. 
 
4. Relevant Potential Variation Due to Alternative Splicing 
One example considered by Griffiths et al. is the Drosophila DSCAM gene.4 This gene has a 
complicated intron-exon structure and is subject to a remarkable and unusually massive 
amount of alternative splicing. This means that, depending on the cell’s differentiation state, 
different parts of the gene are removed by splicing. Thus, rather than coding for a single poly-
peptide, the gene rather provides coding cassettes that can be combined in many different 
ways. By mutually exclusive alternative splicing5, there are an impressive 38,016 splice vari-
ants each of which can lead to the production of a different protein molecule. While alternative 
splicing is quite common in eukaryotic genes, not all cases exhibit this massive range of splice 
variants. For the purposes of this discussion, we can describe the splice mechanism as a cause 
of protein sequence that has 38,016 different states that map bijectively to 38,016 different 																																																								
4 DSCAM stands for Down Syndrome Cell Adhesion Molecule. It is a surface protein ex-
pressed predominantly in neurons and appears to mediate specific cell-cell interactions. In 
invertebrates it is implicated in immune defense while its role in mammals is less clear at pre-
sent.  
5 In this mode of alternative splicing, one of two exons is retained while the other one is re-
moved. Other modes include exon skipping, where a number of adjacent exons are either re-
tained or not, or alternative 5'-donor or 3'-acceptor sites. 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
	
protein sequences. Using their specificity measure, Griffiths et al. calculate that the causal 
specificity of this mechanism amounts to 15.2 bits. At the same time, they calculate the causal 
specificity of the DNA to 0 bits, because they assume that there is only one state in the popula-
tion they are considering (a population of neurons in a Drosophila brain). Thus, Griffiths et al. 
here compare the causal specificity of actual variation of the different causes (SAD) here. If 
this is what is being compared, alternative splicing turns out to be causally more specific than 
DNA variation. 
 How about the other examples discussed in the paper? First, let us consider the 
DSCAM homologs in humans. Here, there are two homologous genes, each of which has only 
3 splice variants. Thus, the causal specificity of splicing comes out as 1.6 bits while that of 
DNA sequence variation as 1 bit. Again, the causal specificity measured concerns actual varia-
tion. Finally, in the case of the entire class of vertebrate cell adhesion molecules, some 100 
genes are capable of generating approximately 150 splice variants each. In this case, the causal 
specificity amounts to 7.2 bits for alternative splicing and 6.6 bits for DNA variation. Griffiths 
et al. conclude that, in this case, “[b]oth DNA and splicing variables are important determi-
nants of diversity in this class of transcripts” (549).  
  What happens when we take into account not only the actual variation but also all the 
relevant potential variation or REL? Is it true that, as Griffiths et al. (2015, 546) claim, “the 
machinery of splicing also changes over evolutionary time, so in the evolutionary case the 
‘biologically normal’ variation in splicing is greater than the amount of variation observed in 
any actual population”? I must disagree. What we are considering here is the possible varia-
tion in protein sequence producible by different alternative splicing machineries while holding 
constant the sequence being spliced. This includes only the variants producible by alternative 
splicing of this same sequence. Within these constraints, evolutionary change in the splice 
machinery cannot produce additional variants, or so I shall argue. 
 To see this, we must take into account some details of the splicing mechanism (for the 
following, see Alberts et al. 2015, 310-320). The boundaries of exons (=coding sequences) 
and introns (=interspersed non-coding sequences) are marked by three kinds of repeated RNA 
sequences known as “splice signals” that are required for RNA-splicing to occur: The 5’-end 
of introns is marked by the sequence AG⏐GURAGU where R is a purine (A or G). The verti-
cal bar indicates where the splice enzymes cut the RNA when the intron is removed. Some-
where within the intron sequence, we find the signal YURAC where Y is a pyrimidine (C or 
U). Finally, at the 3’-end the signal YYYYYYYYNCAG⏐G defines the end of the intron, 
again with “⏐” showing the exact splice site. Only if these three signals occur in a repeated 
fashion on an RNA molecule can alternative splicing work. Of course, there is no necessity in 
the precise nucleotide sequences of these signals; they could well be otherwise. Also, there is 
no telling how many different such sequences could do the same job if the specificities of the 
splice enzymes were altered. Clearly, by altering the enzyme specificities and the splice sig-
nals, a vast number of alternative splice variants could be produced from any given gene. 
 Nonetheless, the question is if this potential variation is what matters. When we con-
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sider a specific genetic locus such as DSCAM and want to know what the causal specificity of 
the alternative splicing mechanism is at this locus, then we should let the RNA sequence of the 
primary transcript unaltered. Now, this sequence is very unlikely to have another set of re-
peated sequences that could serve as splice signals in addition to its actual splice sequences. If 
we altered the specificity of the splice enzymes, we would therefore not obtain a whole new 
set of alternative splice variants that could be made from the same gene sequence. Instead, 
there would not be any splicing going on at all. This is the reason why, unlike the DNA se-
quence and the mRNA sequence, the splice mechanism itself does not have any excess poten-
tial variation. What you see is what you get. 
 Having thus presented an argument that limits the variation and therefore causal speci-
ficity due to alternative splicing, I shall discuss two potential sources of extra variation. 
 First, don't we have to take into account evolutionary mechanisms such as exon repeti-
tion, shuffling, and inversion, as well as cryptic splice sites?6 I think we can safely disregard 
the first three of these. For as I have already argued, what we are interested in here is potential 
variation that is due to variation in splice enzymes while we hold the primary transcript con-
stant. The first three evolutionary mechanisms just mentioned change the primary transcript, 
so they are irrelevant to my argument. The case of cryptic splice sites is somewhat more com-
plex. Here, we must distinguish between two distinct phenomena: (1) inactive splice sites that 
become activated due to a cis-mutation in the splice site itself. Such mutations also change the 
primary transcript and are therefore not relevant to my argument. (2) Cases of so-called "splic-
ing error" where the spliceosome erroneously recognizes a cryptic signal that resembles a 
normal splice site with some low frequency (see Alberts et al. 2015, 321-322). This kind of 
variation may be relevant to my argument, however, it is unlikely to contribute much to splic-
ing-related causal specificity both due to its low frequency and its aleatoric character.7  
Second, another potential source of additional potential variation that we have to con-
sider comes from mad gerrymandered cases, such as the following. Imagine that, each time 
after an intron is removed, the recognition sequences of the splicing enzymes change by a hy-
pothetical intervention. To make this scenario more precise, consider the real causal graph that 
connects a cell's set of spliceosomes with its population of mRNAs. If alternative splicing is 
going on, the former is a causal difference-maker with respect to the latter. In accordance with 
interventionist causal theory, we can represent the spliceosomes and the mRNAs by variables, 
say, C and E that take discrete values C1…Cn and E1…En. Now for the mad part of the scenar-
io: Instead of over well-behaved spliceosomes or different states thereof, we let the C-variable 
range over hypothetical or mad splice agents that change their recognition sequence each time 
after cutting an intron. For example, we could let each individual value Ci stand for a mad 
spliceosome variant that recognizes a sequence α in the first cut, sequence β in the second cut, 																																																								
6 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to these mechanisms. 
7 In general, noise in genetic mechanisms is an interesting issue form the point of view of in-
formation theory that might merit philosophical scrutiny. 
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γ in the third cut, and so on. Now let C range over all possible combinations of α, β, γ, and 
over all other possible recognition sequences δ, ε, φ, …, and combinations thereof. Obviously, 
in this way a much larger number of different mRNA sequences can be produced from the 
primary transcript than with well-behaved spliceosomes that recognize always the same splice 
signals. Because it measures potential variation and maximal entropy and the mad spliceo-
somes are conceptually and physically possible, INF therefore returns a high causal specifici-
ty. However, this is exactly the kind of irrelevant variation that is ruled out by the biological 
normality criterion. The upshot of this discussion is that INF cannot distinguish between rele-
vant and irrelevant causal specificity. 
To conclude, I have shown in this section that the relevant potential variation in alter-
native splicing is identical to the variation producible by mutually exclusive alternative splic-
ing and related mechanisms of the respective gene. As a result, the relevant causal specificity 
REL is given by the values that Griffiths et al. calculated and we do not have to worry how 
many different splice mechanisms evolution might be able to produce. 
  
5. Relevant Potential DNA Sequence Variation 
Of course, we still need to show quantitatively that causal specificity of the REL-kind is actu-
ally greater for the coding sequences. It is easy to calculate the mutual information of possible 
interventions on DNA or mRNA coding sequences with respect to protein sequences. Let us 
consider a coding sequence of 999 bases length, which is about average (DSCAM is much 
longer, with 6kb). Applying combinatorics, there exist 4999 different sequences of that length 
(because there are that many ways of combining the four bases A, T, G, and C to a string of 
999 bases length). Because of the triplet code, this sequence can in principle code for a protein 
of 333 amino acids length. Because there are 20 amino acids to choose from at each position, 
there are 20333 possible protein molecules that could be made. This is much more than the 
number of atoms in the universe, which is estimated to be in the region of 1080. 
 Let us calculate the causal specificity of the causal connection DNA → protein. From 
the 4999 possible nucleotide sequences already calculated we can make 20333 different proteins 
of that length, which equals about 4720. This reduction by 4279 is due to the redundancy of the 
genetic code. The mRNA → protein mapping is therefore not a bijection; it is surjective but 
not injective. However, for a causal specificity calculation à la Griffiths et al. this doesn't mat-
ter, because we can assume for our purposes that the value of the mRNA sequence variable 
completely determines the protein sequence variable. In such a case, the mutual information 
about the effect variable that can be obtained by setting the cause variable to a certain value is 
given by the number of states of the effect variable, assuming that these are equiprobable. We 
thus get an information content of log220333 = 1441.6 bits. In other words, setting the state of 
the mRNA variable by an intervention reduces our uncertainty about the corresponding pro-
tein’s amino acid sequence by 1441.6 bits, which is by far superior to that of the alternative 
splicing mechanism. 
 Critics may object to these figures as not being relevant, because this potential varia-
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tion is surely never realized. So how is it biologically meaningful?  
To counter this objection, I wish to point out that we can limit the range of variants to 
biologically realistic scenarios and still obtain a causal specificity that is vastly superior to 
anything an alternative splice mechanism could produce. An example of such a scenario 
would be the following: Let us consider the variation that can be produced by taking a protein 
of 333 amino acids length and allowing two independent amino acid substitutions at two dif-
ferent sites. This kind of double mutation occurs frequently enough to be biologically relevant. 
Importantly, it does not require an evolutionary timescale (cf. Griffiths et al. 2015, 551). Evo-
lution does not even have to enter into the picture at all. Even on much shorter timescales, e.g., 
a few generations, the relevant protein sequence variation producible by DNA mutations is 
causally more specific than variation due to alternative splicing. 
All that matters for my argument is that we are able to answer questions such as this: 
Q: What would be a biologically relevant range of alternative states (or possible worlds, if you 
prefer) for this gene? A: All the allelic variants that could have been produced by a few bio-
logically normal interventions at a non-negligible probability in the immediate ancestors of the 
cell/organism in question, e.g., point mutations. My point is that even this restricted range of 
alternatives very quickly takes us to very high values of causal specificity.  
For two point mutations, which could surely occur within a few generations in a bio-
logically normal way, we already have a causal specificity of  
 log+ 333 ∗ 3322 ∗ 20+ ≈ 24.4 
 
which is already substantially higher than alternative splicing in Drosophila DSCAM. The 
figure rises rapidly if we allow not only single amino acid substitutions, but other naturally 
occurring mutations such as frameshift mutations, insertions, deletions, inversions, duplica-
tions, etc. This kind of variation is biologically relevant. The reason why it is relevant is not 
the fact that it is actually realized in any population (for it may not be for all DNA sequences) 
but that new variants can be produced by biologically normal interventions, as it was the case 
for alternative splicing. 
 I conclude that there is a relevant kind of causal specificity with respect to protein se-
quences that is greater for DNA and mRNA than for alternative splicing. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The mutual information of variables associated with interventions on a causal variable, pro-
posed as a measure of causal specificity by Griffiths et al., distinguishes some causal factors 
from others and may very well be what incites biologists to often highlight DNA as a major 
cause even though myriads of other causal factors are involved in most biological phenomena. 
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I have argued in this discussion note that what matters in many biological contexts is not the 
causal specificity of the actual variation of an actual-difference maker nor of the potential var-
iation of the actual-difference making causes, but the specificity of the relevant potential varia-
tion in a causal variable. Then, I have shown that this relevant potential variation exhibits a 
higher causal specificity in the case of DNA and mRNA than in the case of splicing agents in 
biologically realistic cases. 
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